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identical product cheaper elsewhere. This provides consumers with some level of comfort in their purchase
decision. A similar low-price guarantee is provided by numerous service industries that allow reservation of
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providers. The ease of price information potentially makes these guarantees very costly to the service or good
provider. We analyze the implied costs associated with these guarantees by making analogies to financial
options. Motivation for this research comes from a large car rental firm, Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group Inc.,
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A common practice among large retailers is the low-price guarantee, rebating consumers if they ﬁnd an identical product
cheaper elsewhere. This provides consumers with some level of comfort in their purchase decision. A similar low-price
guarantee is provided by numerous service industries that allow reservation of capacity, yet do not penalize the consumer
for failure to keep that reservation—examples include hotels and car rental. Given that a consumer is not required to keep
the reservation, they may make another reservation, either at a competing ﬁrm or the same ﬁrm, if future prices decline.
The increasing availability of pricing information on the Internet affords consumers the opportunity to be more strategic in
their purchasing behavior. As consumers, we are able to quickly and easily check prices from numerous service or goods
providers. The ease of price information potentially makes these guarantees very costly to the service or good provider. We
analyze the implied costs associated with these guarantees by making analogies to ﬁnancial options. Motivation for this
research comes from a large car rental ﬁrm, Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group Inc., that considered offering a low-price
guarantee to all consumers that book a reservation though their website.
Subject classiﬁcations : ﬁnance: asset pricing; inventory/production: perishable items; transportation: automobile.
Area of review : New/Nontraditional Areas.
History : Received July 2004; revisions received March 2005, August 2005; accepted August 2005.
1. Introduction
In November 1997, Daimler Chrysler Motors Corpora-
tion divested itself of Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group
(DTAG). Currently, DTAG owns two major car rental
brands: Dollar Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. and Thrifty Rent-
A-Car System, Inc. Based in Tulsa, Oklahoma, DTAG has
grown over the past ﬁve years to approximately 460 world-
wide locations in 26 different countries, including 260 in
the United States. The ﬂeet size now exceeds 200,000 vehi-
cles, of which nearly 100,000 are in the United States.
Their primary focus is on the price-sensitive leisure traveler
in the United States. DTAG’s revenues have grown steadily
over the past ﬁve years and now exceed US$1.3 billion
per year.
DTAG can also claim that they have become one of the
most, if not the most, proﬁtable car rental companies in
the world. “For the third consecutive year, DTAG boasts
the highest proﬁt margin of all car rental companies primar-
ily serving airport-arriving customers” (www.DTAG.com).
The majority of DTAG’s revenues are from corporately
owned outlets for which they actively manage prices, with
a smaller percentage of sales coming from independently
operated franchise outlets. In 1998 they began an imple-
mentation of a Talus Rental Car Revenue Management Sys-
tem. They have spent signiﬁcant time and effort both in
utilizing this system and in developing several other com-
plementary revenue management tools and practices. The
revenue management department balances a conservative
approach while strategically capitalizing on science-based
systematic approaches to pricing.
DTAG concentrates on the value-conscious traveler in
the North American market, typically catering to the leisure
traveler or other consumers who are more price sensitive.
This target market dictates that DTAG must be a low-
cost operator to remain competitive because the margins
on these rentals are thin. Due to the low margins DTAG
maintains, operational efﬁciency is one of their key success
factors.
DTAG relies heavily on revenue management systems to
change up to 100,000 rental rates daily, propelling it to one
of the most proﬁtable companies in the industry. The power
to change many rates helps maintain a competitive advan-
tage in an industry where rates are changing constantly as
companies jockey for the consumer’s business.
1.1. Revenue Management
Airlines have successfully used dynamic pricing and rev-
enue management to increase their proﬁtability. Fares on a
ﬂight can differ dramatically. Segmentation of customers is
achieved, for instance, by restrictions on refunds, requiring
a Saturday night stay or advance purchase. Even a small
percentage increase in revenue per ﬂight can have impor-
tant effects on an airline’s proﬁtability. In fact, American
Airlines attributes over $500 million in additional annual
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revenues to its revenue management activities (Smith et al.
1992). The impact from revenue management is reinforced
by a recent McKinsey & Co. study analyzing Compustat
data for 1,000 companies, indicating that price has the most
dramatic impact on proﬁts (versus costs or volumes), as a
1% increase in price (revenues) generates a 7.4% increase
in proﬁts (Anthes 1998). It is not unusual for an airline to
open a ﬂight for bookings up to a year in advance. The
selective availability of fare classes and the management of
that availability are what constitute revenue management.
The concept of revenue management is not speciﬁc to
the airline industry. It has been applied to numerous other
businesses that have similar characteristics, including car
rental, broadcasting, cruise lines, Internet service provision,
lodging, and railways. There are several common charac-
teristics of yield management practice (Kimes 1989): abil-
ity to segment markets, relatively ﬁxed capacity, perishable
inventory, product sold in advance, ﬂuctuating demand, and
low marginal sales cost/high marginal capacity change cost.
Since the early 1990s the car rental industry has also
given increasing attention to revenue management. Most
work in the area of car rental revenue management has
been the application of airline revenue management meth-
ods to the car rental setting. Carroll and Grimes (1995) and
Geraghty and Johnson (1997) provide accounts of the state
of the art in car rental revenue management.
One of the distinct differences of car rental revenue man-
agement from its application to airlines is the degree to
which prices change. Airlines typically have several dis-
crete price classes, across which prices are fairly constant.
Car rental ﬁrms also have discrete price classes for the
different types of cars (e.g., economy versus luxury) and
different durations of rental (e.g., daily versus weekly), but
actively change the prices within these classes on a daily
basis. Rental companies continually change prices to max-
imize proﬁts. On a particular day, if DTAG has a large
number of cars available they may discount the rental rate
to take advantage of the excess supply, and increase or hold
steady on rates if demand is exceeding expectations.
The car rental market is ﬁercely competitive, with both
Budget and ANC Rental (parent of Alamo and National)
ﬁling for bankruptcy protection in 2002. The industry saw
sharp increases in consumer demand in the late 1990s into
2000, but has seen a dramatic decline in demand since
September 11th, 2001, with relatively ﬂat growth expected
into 2005 (Datamonitor 2003). The competitive nature of
this industry in combination with ﬂat growth prospects sees
the industry becoming more cost conscious.
1.2. Online Sales
The recent proliferation of the Internet has been fully
grasped by the travel industry. Airlines have been among
the ﬁrst to exploit the opportunities presented by the digi-
tal economy. Each year an ever-increasing fraction of their
tickets are sold over the Internet. Revenues from Internet
bookings totaled $276 million in 1996, tripled to $827 in
Table 1. Typical DTAG distribution channel volume
(2003) and associated costs.
% of total Cost to DTAG
Channel bookings per rental
Walkups 14 5
800 number 16 $600
Dollar.com, Thrifty.com 27 $075
Travel agent bookings 13 15
Third-party websites∗ 30 15%
∗Expedia, Orbitz, Travelocity, etc.
1997, and topped $3.3 billion in 1999 (Miller 1999). Recent
surveys have online airline ticket sales at $16 billion in
2001—forecast to reach $40 billion by 2007. While initially
the advent of online sales was seen as a cost-effective way
to reach customers, the recent success of third-party web-
sites such as Orbitz, Travelocity, and Expedia has in fact
increased sales and distribution costs for many ﬁrms. For
instance, DTAG pays commissions of approximately 15%
on bookings received via these third-party websites. Table 1
summarizes DTAG’s selling costs and fraction of sales by
channel.
Online sales through DTAG’s own websites, Dollar.com
and Thrifty.com, are very cost effective, whereas a 15%
commission on rentals that average $40 per day is consid-
erable.
1.3. Cancellations, No-Shows, and
Corporate Rates
The airline industry’s ﬁrst big gains from revenue man-
agement came through the use of overbooking, with over-
booking, representing about 40% of revenue management
beneﬁts (cross 1995). Overbooking is the process of over-
selling seats to compensate for those travelers who fail to
show at departure time. Augmenting overbooking, airlines
offer numerous types of tickets that are nonrefundable if
the consumer fails to make the ﬂight. The car rental indus-
try actively overbooks their ﬂeets, primarily because the
industry typically does not penalize consumers for failure
to keep reservations. Historically, the car rental industry has
had cancellation rates in the neighborhood of 20%–30%.
The lack of penalties for failure to keep a reservation means
a consumer may continue to shop for cheaper rates even
after they have made a reservation. Consumers may have
multiple reservations for the same location and arrival day,
resulting in numerous data difﬁculties for the car rental
ﬁrm, not to mention hidden costs.
A similar hidden cost to the car rental ﬁrm is associated
with corporate and governmental rates. Firms or groups
often get access to discounted rates as a result of mem-
berships or contracts, yet members of these groups are not
obligated to accept these rates—they may shop for lower
rates.
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1.4. The Low-Price Guarantee
In an effort to encourage bookings through their own web-
sites (www.Dollar.com and www.Thrifty.com), DTAG was
considering offering a low-price guarantee. The guaran-
tee was twofold, where ﬁrst, DTAG’s own sites would
have the lowest posted rate of any website for a DTAG
rental vehicle; and second, if rates declined from the time
you reserved your vehicle until the time you picked it
up (and you booked on Dollar or Thrifty.com), DTAG
would refund you the difference. The second aspect of
the guarantee is not new to marketers, and is referred to
as most-favored-customer protection (Png 1991, Cooper
1986). Similarly, the offer is not that different from current
promotions offered by numerous hoteliers. Marriott Inter-
national recently announced a best-rate pledge, where they
would rebate consumers 25% if they found a lower rate—
either through a Marriott channel or third-party source—for
a Marriott room within 48 hours after making a reservation
through Marriott (Binkley 2003).
While the offer seems generous, the low-price guarantee
is already embedded in their cancellation policy (or lack
thereof) and corporate rate agreements, as consumers have
the option to continue to shop for lower rates—the guar-
antee simply makes this option explicit. Before proceeding
with the promotion, DTAG needed to value this option.
2. Evaluating the Promotion
The following section outlines the pricing of the low-price
guarantee. The low-price guarantee may be valued either
empirically using historic data or analytically using a model
of rental prices. Similar to stock price option valuation,
the following details an analytical model of the option.
Later we compare analytical and empirical valuations of the
guarantee.
2.1. Real-Option Analysis
In recent years, a new theory of pricing and operating assets
in the face of uncertainty, and in the presence of some ﬂex-
ibility in operating strategies, has been developed. This is
the theory of real options (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Amram
and Kulatilaka 1999). The theory of real options in turn
uses the framework of modern ﬁnancial options pricing to
frame and solve its problems. For general mathematical ref-
erences on options pricing see Merton (1990), Hull (2003),
and Wilmott (2000).
Different types of real options exist, depending on the
ﬂexibility possessed by the business operator. For exam-
ple, consider a project with known start-up costs that may
be initiated any time in the next year. Such a project may
be modelled as an American call option—the real-option
holder is allowed to “buy into” the project or exercise his
option on any date in the next year. Pricing such an option
requires a decision about the optimal way in which to exer-
cise it. The two problems are solved in tandem.
Table 2. DTAG percentage of reservations by days
prior to pickup during summer 2003.
Percentage Percentage
Days out of total Days out of total
0 14 16 1
1 22 17 1
2 11 18 1
3 6 19 1
4 5 20 1
5 4 21 1
6 4 22 1
7 3 23 1
8 3 24 1
9 2 25 1
10 2 26 1
11 2 27 05
12 2 28 05
13 2 29 05
14 2 30 or more 15
15 2
Note. 0-walkups.
2.2. The Low-Price Guarantee
The booking of a reservation provides the consumer with
the right, with no obligation, to rent the vehicle—they may
continue to shop for lower rates. The low-price guarantee
formalizes this option, as the consumer will pay the min-
imum of the rate they lock in at time of reservation and
all posted rates between that time and when they are due
to pick up their vehicle. The payout to the consumer, who
reserves the car at rate P0, will be
option=max[0 P0−mTT0
]
 (1)
where mTT0 is the minimum of posted rental prices from the
time of reservation T0 until vehicle pickup at time T .
Car rental ﬁrms start taking reservations for vehicles as
early as a year in advance of pickup, with the bulk of the
reservations being made within a few weeks of pickup.
Table 2 provides a representative breakdown of bookings
by days prior to pickup.
Figure 1 displays actual daily rates for a single product
(one car class, ﬁxed rental duration, single location) for
Monday pickups during June 2003. The ﬁgure contains the
rates for Mondays in June as individual series, as well as
the daily average (solid line) of the four Mondays. The
ﬁgure provides some insight into the value of the option
to the consumer because while on average rates tend to
increase as the pickup day approaches, there are several
instances when rates decline.
2.3. Pricing Model
The application of ﬁnancial option-pricing approaches to
the valuation of real assets requires that the value of the
underlying variable follow a random process that is exoge-
nous to the holder. The value of a ﬁnancial option is linked
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Figure 1. Daily rental rates for Monday pickups
during July 2003.
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to the price of a stock, the value or price of which is
dictated by the market, not the owner of the option. This
requirement often limits the accurate application of real-
options analysis.
DTAG primarily rents vehicles at airport locations, and
as a result they cannot create demand through pricing.
Rather, they capture a portion of the business at these loca-
tions, where demand is predominantly the result of air
travel. Price changes do generate subtle changes in demand,
but what is more important is one car rental ﬁrm’s price
against its competition’s (Blair 2002). Figure 2 is a sim-
pliﬁed illustration of price elasticity within the car rental
industry. Price elasticity, the percentage change in quantity
per percentage change in price, describes the sensitivity of
sales volume to price changes. In Figure 2, demand is rel-
atively inelastic over price changes from P2 to P3, as very
little additional sales result (Q2 is small), while very elas-
tic from P1 to P2 (Q1 is quite large). Over the range P1
to P2, the price has crossed a competitor’ price PC , gener-
ating the volume increase (decrease), whereas from P2 to
P3 it is still priced between two competitors, or already has
the lowest price.
Figure 2. Car rental price elasticity.
Q1
∆Q1
Q2 Q3
P1
P2
P3
PC
∆P2 = P2 – P3
∆P1 = P1 – P2
= Q2 – Q1
∆Q2 = Q3 – Q2
Price
Quantity
•
•
•
•
• • •
The net result of this price behavior is that DTAG has
little pricing power and is largely a price-taker, having to
price relative to the competition. As a price-taker, the value
of the low-price guarantee (LPG) is dictated by market
forces, somewhat outside the control of DTAG. Blair and
Anderson (2002) give an accurate account of pricing activ-
ity at DTAG, with Anderson et al. (2004) outlining the
impact of pricing on car rental revenue management.
Given the price response shown in Figure 2, we will
model price as an exogenous random process. In essence,
we are modeling the rental car ﬁrm as a pure price-taker,
unable to arbitrarily price, but having to price relative to
the competition. The valuation of the option requires an
understanding of the evolution of rental prices from the
day of reservation through to pickup. We look at several
approaches to modeling rental car prices, using geometric
Brownian motion (GBM) as the foundational underlying
process.
Figure 3 lays out the timing of the option valuation. A
reservation is made at price P0 at time T0 for pickup of
a vehicle at time T in the future; we look to value the
potential rebate to consumers at some time t between T0
and T . We specify mtT0 as the lowest posted rental price
observed from time T0 to t.
Equation (1) indicates that the option is a function of
the reservation price P0 and the minimum price between
reservation and pickup mTT0 . For car rental ﬁrms of the size
of DTAG, renting nearly 100,000 vehicles daily, the option
can be restated as
option= e−T E[max(0 P0− [mTT0  P0
])]
 (2)
where EmTT0  P0 is the expected minimum price from
reservation until pickup. The option is then the expected
discounted future cash ﬂows (discounting at some risk-
measure-speciﬁc discount rate ) associated with the guar-
antee, noting that if the guarantee is paid it occurs at
pickup.
Equation (2) holds for any price process, and only
requires the calculation of the expectation of the minimum.
2.3.1. Rental Prices Following Geometric Brownian
Motion. GBM is the mainstay in valuing ﬁnancial options
when stock prices are the underlying asset. GBM seems
Figure 3. Option timing and rental prices.
Price
P0
mT0
t
Pt
T0 t T
PickupValuationReservation
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a logical model for rental prices, because, similar to
stock prices, rental prices tend to increase in time, yet
exhibit short-term ﬂuctuations. The basic assumption in this
framework is that prices follow a lognormal random pro-
cess, with a known mean (drift) and standard deviation
(volatility). We will value the LPG option with an underly-
ing following GBM for both constant and time-dependent
parameters, under both real-world (risk-adjusted) and risk-
neutral measures. For all four cases, P0 is the strike price,
mtT0 is the minimum price between time zero (booking), T0,
and the current time, t. For ease of notation, we deﬁne 
as time to expiry, where  = T − t.
GBM Model 1A. Constant drift and volatility under a
real-world (risk-adjusted) measure.
Assume that rental price P follows the lognormal process
dP =Pdt+PdZ (3)
where  and  are the constant real-world drift and volatil-
ity, respectively, and dZ is an increment of a standard
Wiener process. As in Equation (2), we write the option
value as an expectation,
pP
(
Ptm
t
T0
 
)= e−EP [max(0 P0− [mTT0  P0
])]
 (4)
where  is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk-adjusted discount rate, and
the expectation is taken under the probability-generating
measure P , the real-world drift and volatility. The option
value has a closed-form expression (see the appendix for
derivation): for mtT0  P0, we have that
pP
(
Ptm
t
T0
 
)
=−Pte2/2+−N −d+ e−P0N
(−d+√)
+ 
2e−
2+ 2Pt
{(
P0
Pt
)2+2/2
N
(
−d+ 
2+ 2√

)
− e2/2+N −d
}
 (5)
where
d= lnPt/P0+ 
2+

√


and for mtT0 <P0, we have that
pP
(
Ptm
t
T0
 
)
= e−(P0−mtT0
)+mtT0e−N
(−d+√)
−Pte2/2+−N −d+
2e−
2+ 2
·Pt
{(
mtT0
Pt
)2+2/2
N
(
−d+ 
2+ 2√

)
− e2/2+N −d
}
(6)
where
d = ln
(
Pt/m
t
T0
)+ 2+

√


Equations (5) and (6) are of a form similar to ﬁnancial
ﬁxed-strike lookback options (Conze and Viswanathan
1991, Goldman et al. 1979), with differences reﬂecting the
absence of the typical hedging arguments used in ﬁnancial
option pricing.
GBM Model 1B. Constant drift and volatility under a
risk-neutral measure.
It is possible to modify Equation (3) to accommodate
risk-neutral pricing (Trigeorgis 1996). To do so, we must
adjust the real-world drift  downward by subtracting an
appropriate risk premium, and then price the option as
though the world were risk neutral. Let  =  − r/ ,
where r is the risk-free interest rate. The parameter ,
known as the market price of risk, represents the rate of
additional return required by the market for bearing an
additional unit of risk. Then, the risk premium associated
with the rental price is  , and we obtain the risk-neutral
price process,
dP = rPdt+PdZ (7)
by setting = r . For this process, we again write the option
value as an expectation,
pQ
(
P0m
T
T0
 T
)= e−rT EQ[max(0 P0− [mTT0  P0
])]
 (8)
where EQ is the expectation under the risk-neutral prob-
ability-generating measure Q. This leads to an option-
pricing formula similar to Equations (5) and (6), and can
be obtained by substituting r for  and .
If drift and volatility are not constant, then the above
models may either undervalue or overvalue the option. We
believe that at times rental prices may exhibit some time-
dependent behavior. We now extend the models in Equa-
tions (3) and (7) to capture the dynamics of time-dependent
parameters.
GBM Model 2A. Time-dependent drift and volatility
under a real-world risk-adjusted measure.
Let t and t be the real-world drift and volatility at
time t, respectively. The lognormal price process for these
time-dependent parameters becomes
dP =tPdt+tPdZ (9)
This process does not admit a closed-form solution for
the option value. Instead, we employ Monte Carlo sim-
ulation (see, for example, Trigeorgis 1996) to calculate
the expected value of the LPG. Monte Carlo simulation is
advantageous in this setting because it can neatly capture
the path-dependent nature of this option and provide an
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estimate of the option value over the entire booking horizon
for each sample path.
To begin, we divide the booking horizon into N equal
subintervals, so that each period i= 01    N is of length
t = T /N . We generate a sample price path from the dis-
crete stochastic process
Pi =i−1Pi−1t+i−1Pi−1
√
t˜i (10)
where P0 = PT0, i = it, i = it, and each
˜i is a random sample from a standardized normal dis-
tribution. For each sample path, deﬁne mi as minPk over
k iN . Then, the option value vi (at time T ) for each
period becomes
vi =maxPi −mi0 (11)
The Monte Carlo option value is obtained by averaging
over M such path realizations, and discounting back to
time T0. Let v
j
i be the realized option value in period i
for path j , j = 1    M . Then, the Monte Carlo value of
the LPG for each period, priced under the real-world mea-
sure, is
Vi = e−T−Ti
1
M
M∑
j=1
v
j
i  (12)
GBM Model 2B. Time-dependent drift and volatility
under a risk-neutral measure.
The price process of Equation (9) can be adjusted to
allow risk-neutral pricing, as done in the constant parameter
case:
dP = rPdt+tPdZ (13)
Again, we can use Monte Carlo simulation to obtain esti-
mates of the LPG value over the booking horizon. Replac-
ing t and  with r in Equations (10)–(12), enables
Monte Carlo pricing of the option V under the risk-neutral
measure.
2.4. Model Fitting and Parameter Estimation
GBM seems to be a reasonable model for rental car prices
because they tend to increase as the pickup date ap-
proaches, and are always positive. GBM for rental prices
implies that returns on prices (increases period over period)
are normally distributed. Continuously compounded returns
in rental prices are calculated as lnPt/Pt − 1. Tests
for normality in returns were performed visually in con-
junction with chi square tests. Figure 4 displays a sample
histogram and Q-Q plot for overnight rates on intermediate-
size cars at a speciﬁc location for the last week prior to
pickup. Chi-square tests were performed for two separate
locations for both short and long-term rental periods for
four types of rental vehicles with chi-square values ranging
from 0.8 to 4.8 (p-values 0.98 to 0.44); here we do not wish
Figure 4. Daily returns on overnight rentals for inter-
mediate-size cars, last week prior to pickup.
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to reject the null. Generally speaking, while some combi-
nations of rental duration, location, and car type are less
adequately represented by normal distributions, under most
circumstances GBM seems reasonable. Fortunately, combi-
nations that ﬁt the assumptions best, like the one depicted
in Figure 4, are also those where valuation is most critical
because overnight rentals account for the majority of rentals
and exhibit the most volatility in prices. The data from
these two rental locations is used throughout the paper for
parameter estimation and illustration. Time-dependent esti-
mates of  and  are calculated from samples using daily
prices. For example, estimation of drift and volatility in the
last period prior to vehicle pickup, 1 and 1, can be
obtained from samples of lnP0/P1, over a series of pickup
dates, where P0 are prices at pickup and P1 are prices for
vehicles reserved one day in advance provides. The average
of the sample provides an estimate of 1−21/2 and
the standard deviation of the sample an estimate of 1.
2.5. Assessing the Guarantee
As an illustration of the potential cost of the option,
Figure 5 shows a set of hypothetical guarantee payoffs
(i.e., calculating payoffs with actual rental rates). The ﬁg-
ure illustrates the value (cost) of the low-price guaran-
tee to DTAG for overnight rentals (economy and full-size
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Figure 5. Low-price guarantee option value during
summer 2003.
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vehicles), as well as weekly rentals (economy) if it had
been in place in the summer of 2003 for two cities (A
and B).
The empirical evaluation of the guarantee payoffs as
illustrated in Figure 5 is data intensive and only indica-
tive of potential historical payout. The methods developed
in §2.3.1 can be used to evaluate the option under a wide
variety of pricing environments.
Figure 6 compares the different valuation approaches
to the empirical value for economy overnight rentals at
location A. The GBM approaches, both analytical and
numerical, are performed under real-world measures (GBM
Models 1A and 2A in §2.3.1) as growth and volatility
may be estimated from data, with DTAG providing a risk-
adjusted discount rate. Given that price changes at DTAG
are made daily with data for parameter estimation avail-
able at the daily level, t for Monte Carlo valuation was
one day. Growth and volatility were estimated from daily
returns in rental prices. The options are valued for the last
30 days prior to vehicle pickup, with a different set of
growth and volatility values used for each day in the Monte
Carlo formulation.
Figure 6. Comparison of low-price guarantee option
values for economy daily rentals.
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Monte Carlo valuation was performed with 5,000 repli-
cations. Given that the Monte Carlo approach will under-
value the option (a continuously sampled minimum is never
bigger than the discretely sampled minimum), a control
variate form of variance reduction is used to correct for
sampling frequency, similar to the simulation of Asian
options (Wilmott 2000). Using constant growth and volatil-
ity parameters, the true value (V ′) of the option is known
from Equation (5). The discretely sampled values of the
option (Vs) can then be compared to the true value, the dif-
ference a result of sampling frequency. The option value
with time-dependent parameters (Cs) can then be adjusted
based on the sampling error,
Cs =Cs
(
1+ V
′ −Vs
V ′
)
(using a set of common random numbers for both Vs
and Cs). Figure 6 illustrates that the GBM approach may
overvalue the option early on in the process, with the
time-dependent parameter Monte Carlo approach exhibit-
ing similar behavior to the empirical values, but generally
higher valuation.
The cost of low-price guarantee to DTAG can be deter-
mined by calculating the weighted average value of the
option. The weighted average value is calculated by taking
the fraction of consumers who purchase each day prior to
pickup (Table 2) and multiplying that by the value of the
option (as a function of time) and summing these products.
Table 3 summarizes the weighted average cost of the guar-
antee under GBM for numerous parameter sets (constant
parameters) for options in place 30 days prior to vehicle
pickup.
Table 3 uses six sets of parameter values. The ﬁrst four
parameter pairs represent modest values for the average and
standard deviations of growth in car rental prices over the
30-day window just prior to vehicle pickup. The last two
parameter pairs are extreme values calculated from 2003
rental car data. The values represent the lowest and high-
est observed growth rates, 0 and 0.4, respectively; and the
lowest and highest standard deviations, 0.2 and 0.8, respec-
tively. The ﬁrst set 008 represents a no-growth setting
with high volatility and produces very high costs for the
guarantee. The second set 0402 represents high steady
growth, producing lower option value.
Table 3. Low-price guarantee costs ($)
under GBM.
Growth
() Option value
0101 1.02
0103 3.61
0301 0.68
0303 4.19
008 8.66
0402 1.84
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Figure 7. Break-even option value as fraction at DTAG
websites and fraction that switch.
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The purpose for proposing the low-rate guarantee was to
entice online consumers to make reservations on the lower-
cost DTAG websites. Figure 7 illustrates sample break-even
option values as a function of the percent of Internet cus-
tomers that are using DTAG’s site (i.e., 1− x are using a
third-party site) and the fraction of third-party consumers
that switch once the guarantee is offered. The ﬁgure is
based on a rental with an average rate of $40. The trade-off
is the $5.25 saved in booking fees ($0.75 versus commis-
sion of $6.00) versus the options paid out, i.e.,
savings= costs
15% ∗ $4000− $075 ∗ F3rd ∗ Fswitch
= option ∗ 1− F3rd+ F3rd ∗ Fswitch
option= $525 ∗ F3rd ∗ Fswitch
1− F3rd+ F3rd ∗ Fswitch
 (14)
where F3rd is the fraction of Internet reservations made
on third-party sites (Expedia, Orbitz, etc.) and Fswitch is
the fraction of that group that switches to either Dollar or
Thrifty.com.
The option values as summarized in Table 3 indicate
a wide range of valuations with the prices under GBM.
As illustrated in Figure 6, GBM potentially overvalues the
option early on, with the differences between approaches
less dramatic nearing vehicle pickup. Given that the bulk
of reservations occur within the last week of booking, the
guarantee value under GBM provides a basis for assessing
the low-price guarantee. Under extreme parameter pairs,
GBM indicates costs ranging from $1.84 to $8.66, with
reasonable values of $3–$4.
This option would be provided to all customers that
booked on DTAG’s websites. Figure 7 illustrates that to
break even almost all of the trafﬁc from the third-party
websites would have to move to DTAG’s sites to compen-
sate. Under the current consumer booking structure, the
cost of the option seems prohibitive given that 50% of the
online bookings are already on a DTAG site, and these con-
sumers would receive the option even though they were
already booking on the DTAG site prior to undertaking
the incentive program. Given DTAG’s current breakdown
of roughly half of the Internet trafﬁc at either Dollar.com
or Thrifty.com with the other half at third-party websites,
option values must be less than $2.00 to break even, even
if all Internet trafﬁc moves to a DTAG site. The guaran-
tee potentially becomes a useful incentive in the case that
DTAG continues to lose bookings to third-party websites,
with the break-even value approaching the $5.25 in sav-
ings. In this case, the option is justiﬁed to induce switching
to the DTAG site.
3. Conclusions
The insight provided by valuing the option was twofold.
First, the costs associated with rebating consumers does not
signiﬁcantly outweigh the fees associated with third-party
booking. This assessment was based solely on assuming a
constant market share for DTAG, although it is possible that
such a program may elicit switching behavior from other
car rental ﬁrms to DTAG. It is anticipated, given the com-
petitive nature of car rental, that any successful program of
stealing business would quickly be replicated.
Second, bringing the idea forward and pricing it has edu-
cated company executives on the consumer value associated
with costless cancellations and corporate rates. Knowledge
of the associated costs potentially enables the creation of
new (discounted) products that have cancellation fees or
require nonrefundable prepayment.
The development of analytical approaches to valuing
either the option or costless cancellations now provides a
mechanism to include these “costs” in current revenue man-
agement and pricing practices. It is now possible to include
the costs associated with price decreases in future pricing
decisions, whether these costs are direct or indirect.
The guarantee valuation under GBM is also of gen-
eral interest as more ﬁrms look to offer price protection,
whether they are service ﬁrms (Marriott), general retail
(big-box stores), or manufacturers offering meet or release
contracts.
Presently DTAG is deeply discounting rates, by as much
as 20%, at Thrifty and Dollar.com (compared with posted
rates on other channels) in an effort to sway reservation
trafﬁc to their own websites. The secondary z-axis in Fig-
ure 7 represents the break-even discounts (assuming aver-
age rates of $40) as a function of channel makeup and
switching behavior. Clearly, discounts in excess of 5% or
6% are losing money. While the guarantee appears to be
expensive, it clearly is less detrimental than deep discounts.
The low-price guarantee potentially offers consumers per-
ceived value and comfort in their reservation decision and
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can be marketed; as a result, it continues to receive discus-
sion from senior management. The pricing of the guarantee
both empirically and analytically has removed considerable
uncertainty about the potential risks associated with offer-
ing the rate pledge.
Appendix. Risk-Adjusted Option Price
Derivation
In this appendix, we provide the derivation for the option-
pricing formula in Equations (5) and (6). This is the option
price under a ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk measure, where  and 
are the real-world drift and volatility of lnP , respectively.
Recall the notation from §2.3.1: P0 is the strike price, m
t
T0
is the minimum price between time zero (booking), T0, and
the current time, t. We deﬁne  as time to expiry:  =
T − t.
pP
(
Ptm
t
T0
 
)
= e−EP [max(P0−min(mtT0mTt
)
0
)]
= e−{EP [max(P0−mtT00
) mtT0 mTt
]
+EP [max(P0−mTt 0) mtT0 >mTt
]}
 (A1)
The ﬁrst term, indicating that the lowest price has already
been reached, becomes
EP
[
max
(
P0−mtT00
) mT0 mTt ]
=


(
P0−mtT0
)
P
(
mT0 m
T
t
)
 mtT0 <P0
0 mtT0  P0
=


(
P0−mTt0
)[
N
(
ln
(
Pt/m
T
t0
)+

√

)
−
(
mtT0
Pt
)2/2
·N
(
ln
(
mtT0/Pt
)+

√

)]
 mtT0 <P0
0 mtT0  P0
(A2)
where
N
(
ln
(
Pt/m
T
t0
)+

√

)
−
(
mtT0
Pt
)2/2
N
(
ln
(
mtT0/Pt
)+

√

)
is the probability that prices will not decrease below mtT0
(more speciﬁcally, that returns will not be sufﬁciently low
to reach lower prices) as derived in Harrison (1985).
The second term becomes
EP
[
maxP0−mTt 0 mtT0 >mTt
]
=


∫ lnmtT0 /Pt
−

P0−Pteygydy mtT0 <P0
∫ lnP0/Pt
−

P0−Pteygydy mtT0  P0
(A3)
where, for
y = ln m
t
T0
Pt
 0 (A4)
the distribution function gy is
gy= ,
,y
1−PyT  y
= ,
,y
[
N
(−y+

√

)
− e2y/2N
(
y+

√

)]
= 1

√

n
(−y+

√

)
+ 2
2
e2y/
2
N
(
y+

√

)
− 1

√

e2y/
2
n
(
y+

√

)
 (A5)
We now expand the second term of (A3):
∫ lnP0/Pt
−

P0−Ptey
{
1

√

n
(−y+

√

)
+ 2e
2y/2
2
·N
(
y+

√

)
− e
2y/2

√

n
(
y+

√

)}
dy
=P0N
(
lnP0/Pt−

√

)
+P0
{(
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Pt
)2/2
N
(
lnP0/Pt+

√

)
−N
(
lnP0/Pt−

√

)}
+P0N
(
lnP0/Pt−

√

)
−Pte+2/2N
(
lnP0/Pt−+ 2

√

)
−Pt
(

22+
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·
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P0
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 (A6)
So, for mtT0  P0, letting
d= lnPt/P0+ 
2+

√


we have that
pP
(
Ptm
t
T0
 
)
=−Pte2/2+−N −d+ e−P0N
(−d+√)
+ 
2e−
2+ 2Pt
{(
P0
Pt
)2+2/2
N
(
−d+ 
2+ 2√

)
− e2/2+N −d
}
 (A7)
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and a similar treatment of the ﬁrst part of (A3) combined
with the result from (A2) for mtT0 <P0, letting
d = ln
(
Pt/m
t
T0
)+ 2+

√


we have that
pP
(
Ptm
t
T0
 
)
= e−(P0−mtT0
)+mtT0e−N
(−d+√)
−Pte2/2+−rN −d+
2e−
2+ 2
·Pt
{(
mtT0
Pt
)2+2/2
N
(
−d+ 
2+ 2√

)
− e2/2+N −d
}
 (A8)
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